From Washington to the World: Iran, Energy and US Policy

EPISODE:

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VOICE-OVER: Welcome to Fixing Your Interest. In today’s episode, John Studzinski, PIMCO Vice Chairman, speaks with Libby Cantrill, PIMCO’s head of public policy, to get the view from Washington on the big topics of the moment.

Together they explore what might come next in the Iran conflict, as well as its implications for the midterm elections and the US relationship with China.

They also look at what lies ahead for the Federal Reserve and its chair-in-waiting Kevin Warsh

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Libby, I know you're an, I won't say veteran because that sort of dates you. I won't say it dates you, but you've been close to Wall Street and this interesting combination of Wall Street meets Washington now for about 20 years. And you've seen a lot and you have an extraordinary network there.

You're also very savvy with your PIMCO life at markets. But have you seen anything like what we're dealing with today, this incredible overlap of the geopolitical shock of Iran, the impact on energy, the impact on supply chains, and how is this gonna come out? 'Cause we also have an election coming up, a big election coming up in terms of who controls the House and possibly the Senate in the first week of November.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah. Well, it's wonderful to be with you, John. Talk about a veteran in terms of, and I'm not gonna date you, but in terms of your incredible network, both in and out of Washington, so great to be here with you. You know, when I started at PIMCO as an intern in 2006, but then full-time in 2007, I think there was a question of whether do you really need somebody to be kind of the eyes and ears in Washington as it relates to an investment house?

I think the financial crisis back in 2008 was kind of the first case in point that yes, we do need sort of some boots on the ground to  figure out what is happening, how will it impact markets, how will it impact our clients, and making sure that we are feeding that then to our investment professionals so they can hopefully make some client alpha for our clients.

We had the debt ceiling crisis in 2011. I think that was the other sort of the next inflection point, or I remember Bill Gross saying, oh actually this is useful having you around. And then COVID, of course, and then fast forward to Trump 2.0 and if you take a sort of a step back on this administration, just in the first 15 months, it's only been 15 months, it's been, there's been a lot that's happened. You know, he came to this time in office with a much more maximalist view.

I think there's sort of a view of unfinished business, of a sense of urgency. He's not running again, the 22nd Amendment. It's very clear in the Constitution that he cannot run again. So I think what we have seen over the last 15 months is somebody who knows that he has a limited political runway, that he wants to achieve these things.

And, you know, as it relates to the subject at hand with the Iranian war, I think he really, he has had this view of Iran since 1979. I mean, there were interviews in the 1980s where he was talking about Iran and certainly his first Trump administration. I feel like they withdrew from the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement. And I think there was  of this view that there was still more to be done.

And so I think in lots of ways what we're seeing today is President Trump trying to sort of fulfil those things where he did feel like they were unfinished and kind of open-ended. But as it relates to markets, I mean, if you need any sort of evidence that what Washington does matters to markets, it's really through the energy channel.

And you know, if you had our commodities folks, Greg Sharenow, he would say this is the biggest disruption to the energy markets ever. Now the US might be a little bit more protected because we're now an energy exporter versus an energy importer, so maybe a little bit less dependent. But globally speaking, this is an energy shock that again, our commodity folks would say we've never seen.

So to sort of sum it up, Washington does matter to markets. It's certainly mattered during the last 15 months. And I would argue that as government gets more and more embedded in the economy, as fiscal dominates, as monetary policy dominates, I don't think this is going away. I think politics will kinda always matter to market participants going forward.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: So do we think the Middle East has changed now forever in terms of how people regard the Middle East? We have an enormous number of clients there, big pools of capital in the Middle East, across the Middle East.

And of course it's regarded as a major crossroads internationally in terms of travel and logistics. And actually the Magnificent Seven, as you know, were putting a lot of their data centers there. And they're now thinking, actually, I think they're not just thinking, they're deciding perhaps this is not a good idea 'cause it's a war zone. Maybe we'll move our data centers back to Central Europe, possibly to Australia or India.

LIBBY CANTRILL: I mean, I'd love to hear your answer to this just because of all the time that you spent in the region. But I think if you just in terms of the way that the Middle East and our European allies view America as it relates to this decision, I mean, if you go back to earlier this year, the president felt quite emboldened by the military operation that took place in Venezuela. You know, that was, agree with it or disagree with it, it was flawlessly executed. It really was.

LIBBY CANTRILL: And actually, the preceding months have been relatively stable in Venezuela, sort of the plan is working as they had anticipated it. So I think that there was maybe a, maybe we could argue the wrong lesson learned from that, but a lesson learned from that as it relates to Iran.

And I think that sort of emboldened the president, that he felt like he could do it in Venezuela, he could potentially do it in Iran in terms of having a more isolated military strike that could help to sort of decapitate the regime and then lead to maybe this organic regime change. I think there were some risks that were underappreciated. There was an underappreciation of the fact that the Iranians would be so effective in closing the Strait of Hormuz.

There would be, I think, an underappreciation that Iran would then strike against the GCC. So I think, to your question about remaking. And then I think there would be sort of an underappreciation of just the complexity of the situation. I'll throw it back to you in terms of what do you think the ramifications are? 'Cause it feels like because of those risks that were underappreciated, do our allies in the Gulf, can they rely on us? Has that trust been undermined and what are the implications going forward because of that?

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Well, there's no question the US military is the US military, and it has, I think the combination of the US military and the IDF has really resulted in obviously the original elimination of the leadership. But of course, when you talk about leadership of Iran, you're talking about a theocracy that's controlled by 90 men. And even if you eliminated half, you'd still have people who are very determined and very resilient in terms of the domestic impact on that.

You've emboldened a group of people who are granted very controversial in terms of the rights of women, democracy and all of that. But the Strait of Hormuz, no question, has gone from being a logistical issue historically to now becoming a major choke point between Iran and Oman.

And one of the things that we've discovered is how people go about defense is changing drastically. And this whole notion, and you probably see this in Washington, talking about the asymmetrical war that's being fought.

America has very expensive equipment. The Iranians are using drones that cost $15,000 per drone to manufacture, in fact. And they're very effective. So we've created a situation in terms of how we're watching a live case study as to how war is being fought in this environment and how it affects energy markets and how it affects supply chains.

Not really being dependent anymore on one or two or three sources. And I think we know, we see China still being very, very interesting because we talk about China. China apparently has 24, 26 months of oil in storage.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Very prescient.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: 25 nuclear reactors, but they also are very willing to use coal when they need it. So they have a very diversified source of energy. And I think some of the other major players in Asia and in Europe, this is a big wake-up call. And it will ultimately change how energy is seen as a commodity.

LIBBY CANTRILL: And I would be surprised if the Arab states try to diversify away from the Strait of Hormuz going forward, right? I mean, this is more pipelines, more making sure that they're gonna be decreasing the sort of source of leverage that Iran has validated that they have. I mean, this was always an intellectual idea.

This is one of the reasons why other US administrations have not tried to attack Iran. And to be clear, there are a lot of Iranian hawks in Washington. So this is not like a Greenland, for instance, where you would have the entire Congress really trying to stop President Trump from doing anything militarily against Greenland.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Or Cuba!

LIBBY CANTRILL: Or Cuba, maybe a little bit more complicated, honestly. But Iran, the general consensus and anyone who's getting an intelligence briefing in the United States understands that Iran has been a bad actor for a very long time. So they don't have a lot of sympathizers on Capitol Hill for sure. So it is a bit more nuanced in terms of, I think, given Congress's view or what have you. However, now you've kind of fast forward to this point where the president, he's underappreciated these risks and now he has to decide which way to go.

Whether do you sort of declare a victory on paper without a real strategic win, and potentially what does that look like? Does that look like the Strait of Hormuz is still closed, or are the Iranians collecting a toll on oil? Or do you have to escalate to deescalate, and does that potentially include ground troops that is politically so unpopular in the United States, and even though, again, the Iranian regime is viewed as a bad actor, several Iranian hawks on Capitol Hill, that will really have very little support in Washington.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: I mean, let's look at the stakeholders here. 'Cause we're talking about the US domestic stakeholder, that's very different because the Middle East players are, even though they're being very discreet about it, the majority of the Middle East players are in favor of this.

As a matter of fact, one or two of the large oil economies in the Middle East said to me, well, look, we've had a plan in place for four years for some type of war between Iran and Israel. We knew this would happen eventually. We are prepared. Logistically, we knew this would happen. We didn't necessarily know when it would happen. We knew it would happen. So they are tacitly trying to be supportive and encourage what Donald Trump is doing.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Right. And I think he, so he faces that. I think he faces the, obviously the pressure from Israel as well in order to keep it going and not to necessarily declare a victory when there isn't really a strategic victory at the same time.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: And Netanyahu's constituencies are being very tough on him right now about what constitutes victory.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Absolutely.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: My sense is they're saying there hasn't been regime change, there hasn't been clarity about the…

LIBBY CANTRILL: The nuclear…

JOHN STUDZINSKI: The missiles and the nuclear enrichment. So they're very, the right-wing strong constituency in Israel saying, hello, you haven't accomplished very much.

LIBBY CANTRILL: You know, and I think, you know, so, and then you kind of go to the United States, and as you know, foreign policy is never kind of a top issue among voters. Americans have the luxury of it not being a number one, two, three, four, or five issue. Usually, it's number eight or nine.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Unless it affects gas and groceries.

LIBBY CANTRILL: But unless it affects gas and groceries, which is where I was gonna come to. So even though I think that President Trump, from the Arab states, particularly from Israel, will continue to have pressure to really stay in there and to drive a hard bargain and what have you, I think he has a lot of domestic pressure just to call it a day.

And again, we could argue that maybe that it will be a strategic defeat, but domestically, the longer this goes on and the higher oil prices stay, and I think we could maybe argue about how the oil market is priced right now. I mean, the oil market is quite sanguine about this, right? It has the high kind of spot month dates, but then in the later contracts, it sort of is assuming this all kind of goes back to normal pretty neatly.

And again, I think if our commodity folks were here, they would say that's probably not gonna be the case. That even if the strait were to reopen tomorrow, it's not just about the strait reopening, it's about the sort of supply shut-in that we've seen. So it's kind of getting all of those wells started again. And just practically speaking, that means that the oil market's not likely to normalize not just for weeks, but maybe for months.

And so that just means you have elevated oil prices, which means you have elevated gas prices. So even if this just domestically in the US, if this ends tomorrow, voters are gonna face higher gas prices probably throughout the summer. And of course, as you know, that's sort of peak driving time for Americans.

So I do think President Trump, I mean, this is a real, he's kind of boxed in here because he has, on one hand, the Arab states, he has Israel, I think he has his own view of Iran being a bad actor that he really does wanna get some real concessions and some real wins. But then he also has the domestic politics of it, which again are just horrible for him. But I just can't, I can't, you know.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: But you've been following him for a long time. He's, and as you said very well, he came into a second administration exceptionally well prepared. He chose a cabinet that was very much in line with his policy initiatives, and he's what you've described as one of the most resilient presidents we've ever seen in terms of taking a position, supporting it, and being very diligent about it and dogged.

He doesn't really, now we have the tactical nuance that people like to refer to. But in this case, how do you see this evolving in the wake of this election that's coming up very soon?

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah, I think that, you know, President Trump is criticized a lot by the US media and the international media for being very tactical, for being very sort of just responsive and not strategic. And I would push back on that. I actually think as we kind of talked about in the very beginning, he's been talking about some of these things not only since his first administration, but really since the 1980s, the 1990s when he became kind of a public figure, still a private citizen, Iran being one of them, tariffs being another one.

This idea of America fighting forever wars, maybe ironically, but he's been very consistent on some of these things. So I do think that it is a tension between wanting to achieve something and looking at his legacy and understanding that he's not gonna be running again with also, again, the domestic political pressures.

And I will also say that we're only in April, and as you know, a month is just a lifetime in the political cycle these days. And if you actually look at 2022 in the spring, President Biden was facing very high gas prices, much higher actually than now, $5 per gallon. His approval rating was actually even lower than where Trump's was. And everybody at that point was prognosticating this big Republican wave, that Republicans would take back both chambers of Congress easily, and it would be this huge outpouring.

And then you fast forward to right before the election and the political environment looked very different. And of course what ended up happening is yes, Republicans took back the House, not by many seats though, and in fact they lost a seat in the Senate instead of winning a seat.

So I think this is where it's really difficult, even though everyone wants to extrapolate too much about the political environment, what it looks like now in April of an election year, and fast forward that seven months to what it actually will be in the election.

And just my last point to the point that you were making, you know, love the president, don't like the president, he's been able to persuade people in his own party to do things that they don't wanna do, that they don't usually believe in or don't usually support or what have you. He's been able to really create this movement.

I mean, Trumpism is the Republican Party now. And so I do think that even though he's kind of gotten himself in a political box on this Iranian conflict, don't underestimate him because he's been able to pull a proverbial rabbit out of the hat before and he might be able to do that again.

It's just obviously unlike tariffs, war is much harder to end. Tariffs you can roll on and roll off. Starting a war, as tried as it sounds, is easy. Of course, finishing one is much more difficult. 

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Now let's change gears here. And how long is Jerome Powell gonna be Fed Chair?

LIBBY CANTRILL: We were just joking today that we're coming in with headlines about…

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Mike's gonna have, and when do we think Kevin Warsh might be interviewed by the Senate?

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah, so I think, you know, a couple of things just to remember, and then I'll get to your question. And you know this very well, but I do think it's just worth reminding folks that the Fed is comprised of seven Fed board governors. Those people are nominated by presidents, confirmed by the Senate, takes 50 votes to confirm.

But the body that actually changes monetary policy and changes balance sheet policy, QT, QE or what have you, is comprised of a bigger group, the 12 FOMC members that include those seven Fed board governors, and then also the five regional presidents.

And the reason I just, I know that's pedantic, but it's important because while the chair is important, practically speaking, the chair is just one of 12 who's gonna be voting, and you need seven of 12 to actually change monetary policy. So I think in some ways the market gets, you know…

JOHN STUDZINSKI: I think this is actually the first time in history where this has been the case, because historically we've had such strong Fed chairs that have been such dominant media profiles that people, this is the first time we talk about dot plots, and all these things that people are saying, as you said, the constituency voting of the 12.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: And because now we talk about the voting and we talk about who's, and each of those Fed chairs, regional chairs has some type of media profile. And they often talk about it in one way or another before the vote. But I think this is probably the first time that the public at large really understands that it is…

LIBBY CANTRILL: A much bigger group.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: A much, it's a consensus.

LIBBY CANTRILL: It's a consensus. And I think again, the chair, and we have the benefit of having Rich Clarida at PIMCO, who was the vice chair under Chairman Powell. And he'll say that the chair is very important, right?

So I don't wanna belittle that, but he'll also just remind us very quickly that that person only votes once. And so he is only one, you know, it is not Chicago. He's only one of 12. And so while I think this question about when Kevin Warsh, who's been nominated for the chairman to replace Powell when he rolls off, that's important, but I think we just also need to contextualize it that again, he's only one voice.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: You've known Kevin Warsh for a long time.

LIBBY CANTRILL: And so have you. We both worked at Morgan Stanley with him, and he's a wonderful guy. And I think that he will have no problem getting confirmed. So this is important because Powell's term ends May 15th. I don't think that Kevin Warsh will have any issue getting confirmed.

The first stop is the Senate Banking Committee, then he goes to the Senate. He just needs 50 votes. Republicans have 53. So he will easily get confirmed. He may even get a Democrat or two to vote for him. However, the big issue right now is that there's also kind of in parallel a criminal investigation into Chairman Powell that President Trump and his Department of Justice has initiated, and Senator Tillis, a Republican senator, has said he will not let the nomination of Kevin Warsh go through to get to a floor vote or a committee vote until the DOJ withdraws that investigation.

And unfortunately, John, you would think that the Department of Justice, because the courts have said in many different motions that this case doesn't really have merit and should be thrown out and what have you, and still the Department of Justice is proceeding. So this is a little bit of an own goal, honestly.

Like if President Trump wants his people in, then he needs to allow for this investigation to be concluded and withdrawn or what have you. But it doesn't look like that. So I think the bottom line for markets is that if you're really obsessed with Kevin Warsh and when he's gonna get in, there is a high probability that he will not get confirmed until the summer, if not maybe even later.

And it'll be dependent on when President Trump's Department of Justice withdraws this investigation into Powell, which has already been objectively undermined as it doesn't really have a lot of legal bearing. So it's not like this thing is really that serious.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: But if it does get resolved, how do you see, I realize we can't predict everything and we don't have a crystal ball, but how do you see Kevin Warsh as a Fed governor?

LIBBY CANTRILL: As a Fed chair. I mean, I think he's gonna be, you know, I think, will he be maybe more inclined to be a bit more dovish because of this sort of productivity? I don't know. I mean, he's a very smart guy, as we all know. He's gonna be in the Fed partly for Trump's term, but also then for somebody else's term.

So he's also gonna be focused on his legacy. So I think he's gonna be data-oriented, maybe a little bit of a tilt to be dovish, but again, he's only one vote. I mean, our view just on Fed policy is that we do think that the Fed will be able to get one cut in this year.

Now, of course, this is very much predicated on how the Iranian conflict plays out, but even though folks in the market have been focused on the inflation side of this and the potential inflation shock, there are lots of times in history where an inflation shock turns into a growth shock.

And I think that is our concern, is that with higher gas prices, this one big beautiful bill that was supposed to kind of save the economy in America in 2026, that could basically be negated because of these higher gas prices, particularly for that lower to middle income cohort. And that could be a drag on growth.

And then of course if you have less AI CapEx and what have you, so this is what we're monitoring. We're monitoring does this energy shock, maybe an inflation shock, really actually turn quickly into a growth shock. And then does the Fed actually have to cut once or maybe even twice?

That becomes the open question. But our base case at this point, growth is gonna, you know, we think that growth is ratcheted down from kind of the 2% that we had in the beginning of the year to something like 1.5 to a little bit higher.

Inflation is gonna tick up a little bit because of this conflict in terms of headline inflation, and core might tick up a little bit as well. But again, I think we're more concerned about the downside risks to growth than the concern that inflation is gonna become more systematic.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: If we didn't have the war, we were looking at an economy that's actually quite resilient and quite strong and quite robust. It was driven very much last year by the fiscal stimulus of the AI infrastructure buildout.

And even today the Treasury Secretary Bessent said that he thought the growth this year was going to be somewhere between three and 3.5%, which I thought…

LIBBY CANTRILL: Nominally… I dunno,

JOHN STUDZINSKI: I thought it was interesting. I thought it was interesting and it'd be interesting to comment on that. Because that of course is what the economy probably would do if you didn't have all this uncertainty that the war has introduced.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah. Again, and you know, as you know, I've been sort of using this reductive metaphor about President Trump's policies had been sort of this mixture of vegetables and dessert for the economy. And you had sort of the vegetables really front-loaded last year.

You had tariffs, you had immigration policy in terms of pulling back on immigration. And then the dessert was going to be in 2026. So we had eaten our vegetables. We were waiting for the dessert. The dessert was gonna be the one big beautiful bill, that big tax bill that was passed last year. But its effects don't really start hitting the economy until this year, particularly the first half of 2026, plus ongoing CapEx investment, plus deregulation, which is also something we shouldn't forget that's happening in the background. That is a slow burn, but it still does have a positive effect, at least at the margins in terms of access to capital and in terms of the velocity of money.

So, you know, as it relates to banking deregulation in particular, so we were planning on a pretty robust consumer. And that's not to say that that can't still come to fruition. It's just, again, the longer this conflict lasts, the more elevated oil prices and gas prices are, the more that is going to hurt the consumer, and again, more at that lower and middle end, which have a higher marginal propensity to consume. Right? They're putting more of every dollar that they get into the economy.

So if they're already pulling back and pulling back even further because of higher gas prices and because of uncertainty about the future, then I think again, the economy maybe will slow more than what the Treasury Secretary would like.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: One of the things everyone always talks about when you talk about Trump, and of course he's postponed his trip to China once, but it's now scheduled to take place in about four weeks. And of course the world wants to see America and China have a closer working dialogue and relationship.

Obviously China has come out today making, I don't know if you saw, they made a few comments which Trump supported, saying they were not supporting the Iranian military initiatives in the war in the Middle East.

How do you see, obviously you've talked eloquently over the last several years about China being the true bipartisan issue that Democrats and Republicans alike are very devoted to dealing with China as both a challenge and an adversary. How do you see this from Trump's point of view right now?

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah, I think that President Trump actually just posted on Truth Social that he's going to give President Xi a big fat hug when he sees him in May. So, or maybe that he was gonna give him a big fat hug anyway. Sometimes there's him hugging supposedly that we should be anticipating for that summit.

I mean, I think that if I go back to the beginning of Trump 2.0 and the thing that I probably was the most wrong about, I think we've had good calls about some of the things, the thing I was the most wrong about was just about expecting this administration to be a lot more hawkish on China. I would argue President Biden was actually pretty hawkish on China in terms of the export controls.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Semiconductors…

LIBBY CANTRILL: Continuing the tariffs. Yeah, he really was. And I think that the Chinese were a little bit caught off guard, right? That our friend Gina Raimondo, who's the Secretary of Commerce under President Biden, put these really pretty novel export controls or prohibitions on the US selling advanced semiconductors to China.

And so, if anything, I thought it would just be at least a continuation, if not a ratcheting up. And it was initially right, if you remember, we had that trade embargo on China, 145% tariffs, if you remember, back in last spring after Liberation Day.

And things did feel like they were escalating pretty quickly. And then I think China kind of played their trump card, so to speak, which was around critical minerals. And this is a little bit like the Strait of Hormuz.

This is like the source of leverage and President Trump's all about leverage and what have you. And I think what China showed is that they do have, again, to belabor the metaphor, a real trump card here in terms of access to critical minerals. And the fact that they basically put a prohibition on selling critical minerals to us, and that was obviously gonna have many downstream consequences for the economy.

And so that led the Trump administration to pivot quite quickly, roll off most of the tariffs. We still had to have some tariffs on China, and then really to decrease the rhetoric. And I think that's probably a good thing for the world, right? I think we want these two superpowers to be…

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Even allowing Nvidia to sell which is a strategic chip to the Chinese.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yeah. Which I think, I mean, the press hasn't necessarily covered this as well, but there's a huge backlash on Capitol Hill around that. Republicans and Democrats alike were shocked. And it doesn't make a lot of strategic sense, national security sense and what have you. So I think from my understanding, some of those sales have actually not gone through, that they've been more delays, maybe not that surprising.

But I think your question though, I mean there's the sort of short term, medium term about what happens between the US and China during these last two and a half years of the Trump administration. But then I think there's a bigger question of what happens between the US and China after Trump leaves.

And I think my view is that whomever is gonna be the president next in 2029 is likely to be more of that conventional Washington approach of viewing China maybe as more of an adversary, at least as a competitor if not an adversary.

And so some of this reprieve maybe that we've gotten between the US and China, I think is a likelihood that some of those risks come back and that China really does become more of the focal point in terms of national security perspective, in terms of economic statecraft.

And of course meanwhile, China is just taking advantage of a more distracted America, right? I mean, in terms of the technological advances that they're making, in terms of really trying to ingratiate themselves with the rest of the world.

And just to wrap this up, I think, what does that mean for markets? It means more volatility, it means more geopolitical volatility, it means more uncertainty. We think that's a great environment for active management or for bonds, of course. But I do think that this is going to be much more the new normal, right? That more geopolitical uncertainty causing market volatility.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Libby, far too short. We could talk for a long time.

We could obviously, we could have talked about tariffs, we could talk about Liberation Day two, three. And I'm sure there's a lot more things to come.

LIBBY CANTRILL: Yes. Always wonderful to be talking to you, John. Thank you so much.

JOHN STUDZINSKI: Thank you.

VOICE-OVER: Thanks for joining us on Fixing Your Interest as we explored some of the major geopolitical themes driving markets right now. 

Stay with us as we continue to navigate the challenges and opportunities across the investment landscape. For deeper insights, analysis and resources, visit PIMCO.com